This is the essence what I gather from this strange discussion: You come from a distorted world, where you use apps which track your behaviour etc. and as countermeasures you use other apps which promise to alleviate that (which they cannot really, because a stock Android and iOS prevent them to perform tasks at OS level). This is a cat and mouse game you cannot win against Meta etc. And you do not have the slightest chance against Google or Apple, because their OSes control you, not you them.
If you insist on using Android apps from other sources than F-Droid, you already gave up privacy. “Privacy-enhanced” AOSP derivatives as GrapheneOS, CopperheadOS, CalyxOS, DivestOS may slightly alleviate some things locally, but will not (because they cannot) prevent any corporation from tracking you across their services, starting with things as simple that your requests come from the same IP address, to more sophisticated tracking mechanisms.
What SailfishOS offers you is control over the OS and the ability to customise everything. Additionally, if you know Linux / Unix well, to have basically the same environment on your phone as on your desktop or laptop computer.
And yes, privacy is primarily the lack of surveillance. You seem to take surveillance as given and believe that a set of tools can alleviate that: No they cannot, if the OS and / or the apps you are using are spying on you.
The decisive point you have not revealed yet is, what do you want to do with this smartphone? Make calls, write e-mails and SMS? Or use Meta’s original Facebook app?
P.S.: As @attah already denoted, most of these “privacy enhancing mechanisms” as e.g. MAC-address randomisation are of very limited utility, mostly just a security / privacy show which also bears some drawbacks, if you look more closely what they technically do. E.g. MAC-address randomisation prevents a router (usually a WLAN / WiFi router) to recognise your device again, but only if that router does not use other fingerprinting mechanisms; consequently its utility is minimal. IMO it is better to generally not contact WLAN access points you do not trust.
The same line of arguments can be applied to other “privacy enhancing mechanisms”.